Juni Alonzo Church, Frege Gottlob. Der Gedanke. Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, vol. 1 no. 2, pp. 58–Frege Gottlob. Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege was a German philosopher, logician, and mathematician. He is .. “Der Gedanke: Eine logische Untersuchung” (“The Thought: A Logical Inquiry”), in Beiträge zur Philosophie des Deutschen Idealismus I: 58– After his retirement in , Frege moved to Bad Kleinen, near Wismar, and managed to publish a number of important articles, “Der Gedanke” (“The Thought “.

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Rather, it flanks terms for truth-values to form a term for a truth-value. Therefore, these expressions are meaningful, but do not have references. Kaal in Gabriel et al.

For more on the distinction of gedanme of concepts, see above. His ideas spread freege through those he influenced, such as Russell, Wittgenstein, and Carnap, and through work on logic and semantics by Polish logicians. Find it on Scholar. Views Read Edit View history. They draw on Frege’s late manuscript on the ‘sources of cognition [Erkennntisquellen]’ 71where Frege sketches the following picture of knowledge: He instead attempted to develop a new theory of the nature of arithmetic based on Kantian pure intuitions of space.

Frege on Thoughts* | Mind | Oxford Academic

gednake In his own logical systems, Frege introduced signs standing for the negation and conditional functions. Frege then introduced two axioms dealing with these value-ranges. They had at least two children, who unfortunately died young. For one, the authors seem to take the purity of ‘pure or logical’ thinking to require that anything besides logical content be excluded from the mind altogether: Felix Meiner; second, expanded edition, Edited by Michael Beaney.

This omission also means gedqnke Garavaso and Vassallo do not attempt any comparison with a Kantian classification of the various types of thinking that humans are capable of, though this comparison would have been useful in helping to sharpen the precise import of their positive account of Frege on thinking Gedamke 3.

What Garavaso and Vassallo never directly address, however, is gedankd possibility so central to motivating Frege’s logicism in the first place — namely, that thinking is capable of much more than merely grasping thoughts.

Frege uses the example of a specific sensed phenomenon: If we are simply asked to consider what “two” means independently of the context of a sentence, we are likely to simply imagine the numeral “2”, or perhaps some conglomeration of gedankf things.


While conventional accounts of meaning took expressions to have just one feature referenceFrege introduced the view that expressions have two different aspects of significance: This sense picks out Aristotle the person because he alone matches this description.

This is a brief reply to Cantor, G.

Frege, Gottlob | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Several things about this interpretive taxonomy seem problematic. Liberal Arts Press, Suppose that ” H ” stands for this concept, and ” a ” is a constant for Aristotle, and ” b ” is a constant for the city of Boston.

Herman Pohle, ; reprinted in Angelelli [] pp. However, his work was interrupted by changes to his views. For example, if we consider the propositions:.

In an attempt to explicate the notion further, Frege gives a tentative catalog of things truth — which for the sake of discussion he assumes is a property — may be predicated of: Beliefs depend for their make-up on how certain objects and concepts are presented, not only on the objects and concepts themselves.

As Frege understands this, it means that if two expressions have the same reference, they should be able to replace each other within any proposition without changing the truth-value of that proposition.

Trained as a mathematician, Frege’s interests in logic grew out of his interests in the foundations of arithmetic. Oxford University Press, To give some examples, if there are zero F s, then the number of F s, i. However, while the volume was already in the publication process, Frege received a letter from Bertrand Russell, informing him that it was possible to prove a contradiction in the logical system of the first volume of the G rundgesetzewhich included a naive calculus for classes.

Frege’s “conceptual notation” however can represent such inferences. Frege’s Theory of Judgment. As articulated in the Grundlagen and refined in the Grundgesetze and elsewhere, Frege’s logicism seems to involve: Garavaso and Vassallo’s discussion of the epistemic significance of thinking in Chapter 4, however, remains at arms’ length from any prolonged or substantive engagement with the Kantian background framing the core commitments of Frege’s logicism, and so does not go into any detail on Frege’s revisionary account of how thinking or ‘reason’ can ‘give’ itself logical and arithmetical content and also autonomously establish justify, prove truths via these contents on the basis of its own laws alone.


Gottlob Frege

Peter Geach, Blackwell, Edited and translated by Terrell W. While there is therefore much of interest in the general orientation that Garavaso and Vassallo pursue, my focus will be on Chaptersand the respects in which their exposition leaves their two main themes thinking and its epistemic significance underdeveloped.

The property of ver the pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander is unique to Aristotle, and thus, it may be in virtue of associating this information with the name “Aristotle” that this name may be used to refer to Frdge. Only purely logical and the hybrid logical-psychological thinking that can ‘aim at’ thoughts 57 ; only these other types of thinking ‘can dr us epistemic access to those objective entities that are ontologically independent from us and that guarantee us knowledge’ 58; compare Frege was able to define the ancestral of relations logically even in his early work.

Frege, however, does not leave his analysis of numbers there. Gottlob Frege – – Philosophical Review 59 1: Here we can see the connection with the understanding of number expressions as geeanke statements about concepts. Stoothoof in Stoothoff [], in Klemke [] pp. Logical axioms are true because they express true thoughts about these entities. Causal theory of reference Contrast theory of meaning Contrastivism Conventionalism Cratylism Deconstruction Descriptivist theory of names Direct reference theory Dramatism Expressivism Linguistic determinism Logical atomism Logical positivism Mediated reference theory Nominalism Non-cognitivism Phallogocentrism Quietism Relevance theory Semantic externalism Semantic holism Structuralism Supposition theory Symbiosism Theological noncognitivism Theory of descriptions Verification theory.

For Frege, the distinction applies also to other sorts of expressions and even whole sentences or propositions. Already in the Begriffsschrift important preliminary theorems, for example a generalized form of law of trichotomywere derived within what Frege understood to be pure logic. Clearly, however, these expressions do not present that concept in the same way.

Bynum in Bynum [] pp. Note, however, that thinking would then count as purely logical whether or not the thoughts involved are ‘about’ anything specifically logical.

Feigl in Feigl and Sellars [] pp.